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VASILIEV'S IMAGINARY LOGIC AND ТНЕ 
TREATMENT OF CONTRADICTION IN EPISTEMIC 
LOGIC 
In his Imaginaтy Logic Vasiliev attempted to pave the way 
for а new logic, which consicleraЬ\y deviates from the traditional 
classical logic. Не addresses himself to the task, to open space for 
а genuine non-classical logic, "to deшonstrate that а new logic and 
other logical operations thaн those which we use a.re possiЫe, to 
show that our Aristoteliaн logic is only one among many possiЫe 
logical systems. This new logic will not Ье а new presentation of 
the old logic, it will differ not iв the display, lщt in the treatment 
of the logical operations themselves; this will Ье the "new logic", 
and not а new treatise concerning logic" ([3], р. 53). 
Vasiliev initiates а free view on possiЫe logical systems, а 
view which opens important perspectives for the development 
for different non-classical logics. Not convincing are, however, the 
reasons given Ьу Vasiliev for the development of а new logic and the 
description of the relations between the new logic and the received 
Aristotelian logic, which is ti-eated Ьу Vasiliev as the traditional 
cla.ssically determined logic. 
Especially the following points of а misconception about the 
relation between old ( Aristotelian oi- classical) logic and the new 
deviant (imaginary or non-classical) logic should Ье addressed: 
1. Vasiliev holds that the logical laws are determined Ьу the 
features of the world: They сап Ье sound in one world but unsound 
in another world: "While the Aristotelian logic is true for our world, 
the non-Aristotelian logic сап Ье true only iн some different world" 
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([3], р . 54). This other \vorld of the non-Aristoteliah imaginary logic 
is а world differing from the real vюrld, an imaginary world, а world 
ршеlу ideally constructed ([3J, р . 54). 
2. Based on the differing world-reference of classical and 
imaginary logic, Vasiliev draws the conclusion, that between 
the two logics exists а contradictory opposition , confusing 
"contradictory" with " coпtrary", because he intends to assert 
only that the formulae of classical and imaginary logic are 
exclнding each other: "The formulae of both logics will staпd in 
а contradictory opposition: the trнth of the formнlae of imaginary 
logic excludes the truth of the formulae of our Aristotelian logic 
and vice versa. Because of this, not both can Ье true for one 
and the same "'orld" ([3], р . 54). Vasiliev presupposes only two 
different worlds: tl1e real and the imaginary world. However it is 
not excluded, that one considers different imaginary worlds, for 
which according to Vasiliev different logical laws should Ье true. 
So there is no excluded middle for the logical laws of the rcal world 
and the imaginary world of Vasiliev. 
3. Vasiliev has in mind а special imagiнary logic, one in which 
the law of contradiction does not hold. So in the imaginary logic 
one logical law is missing, wl1ich holds in the Aristotelian logic. 
But we have in the imagi11ary logic no concerning the law 
of contradiction opposite law, which would stand in а contrary 
opposition to the law of contradiction, as Vasiliev suggests with 
his remark about tl1e contradictory relation between the laws of 
the two logics. 
4. Interestingly, Vasiliev indicates no logical law which holds in 
the imaginary logic but does not hold in the Aristotelian logic. In 
Vasiliev's new imaginary logic we }1ave no new laws iп comparison 
with the old Aristotelian logic. This way the imaginary logic proves 
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to Ье а partial system of the old Aristotelian logic ([3] , р . 57). This 
of course contradicts the starting a.c:;sertion of Vasiliev, that the new 
imaginary logic contains such laws, which contradict the laws of 
the old logic. 
What the law of contradiction expresses is understood Ьу 
Vasiliev in an ontological sense: "А can not Ье non-A. No object 
includes а contradiction into itself." ([3] , р . 59) . In this sense 
there is no douЬt about the validity of the contradiction law ш 
our world. There are по ontological situations iп our world, in 
which assertive and negative judgments about the same object 
can Ье true. But there can Ье epistemic situations in which 
contradictory assertions can Ье formed about an object, which 
does not include а contradiction in itself. And such epistemic 
situations are not excluded Ьу the laws, governing ош world. So 
the existence of epistemic contradictions is entirely compatiЫe 
with the soundness of the law of contradiction in our world. 
Without having to leave our world, space is made for the imaginary 
logic, if we are referring to epistemic worlds, worlds of assent or 
imagination, in which а sentence and its negation can Ье taken 
for true at the same time. These epistemic worlds differ from the 
ontological worlds not only in tl1e fact that а sentence and its 
negation can Ье true simultaneoнsly, but also in the fact that 
neither the sentence nor its negation are asserted or taken as 
true in the imagination, thus, neither the sentence nor its negation 
being epistemically true. The possiЬility of the imaginary logic is 
bound to the possiЬility of imaginary worlds and these worlds are 
epistemic worlds, not ontologically realized or realizaЫe worlds, 
wblch are presupposed in а dialethic conception of logic. With 
the determination of imaginary worlds as epistemic worlds we 
absolutely agree with Vasiliev, who determines the imaginary 
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vюr]ds (воображаемые миры) just as irnaginaЫe wor]ds, which 
can exist in our consciousness. The epistemic worlds are exactly 
such imagiпed worlds but not real worlds a.nd they do not have to 
Ье ontologically possiЫe worlds, although they are episternically 
possiЫe worlds. 
In these epistemic worlds another logic than in the real world is 
actually valid. In epistemic worlds all sentences are true, which are 
explicitly agreed Ьу the epistemic subject. However, what logically 
results from epistemic truth is also episternically true. Therefore all 
logical consequences from sentences which are explicitly assented to 
Ьу the epistemic subject are epistemically true. Epistemic truth in 
this sense is equivalent with what is norrnally captured Ьу the idea 
of implicit assent or implicit belief. The logic, which deterrnines 
whichever epistemic truths сап Ье derived frorn given epistemic 
truths, is the irnaginary logic. And this imaginary logic cannot Ье 
the traditional classical logic, which presupposes that а sentence 
or its negation has to Ье true a.nd not both of them can Ье true. 
The imaginary logic has to live with the logical possiЬility that 
botl1 а sentence and its negation are epistemically true and none 
of them is epistemically true. So the imaginary logic has to exclude 
not only the principle of contradiction and the excluded rniddle, 
but all those classical sound principles, which presuppose that а 
seнtence and its negation cannot Ье both true and that one of 
them has to Ье true. This points in the direction of the system of 
the tautological entailments ([1], §§15, 19), ([2), §80) as the right 
imaginary logic. 
However, with his idea of the imaginary logic Vasiliev remains 
in the traditional system of logic and considers only imaginary 
syllogistics. Unfortunately, he gives no hints how to construct an 
imaginary propositional logic in the modern sense. lf we intend 
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to construct an iшаgiнагу p1·opositional logic, which deviates fгош 
the classical logic just Ьу tlle treatment of negation, but treats all 
other propositioнal conнectives according to the classical semantic 
principles fог these connectives, then we do not arrive at the system 
of tautological entailment, but at а system, which overlaps with tl1e 
system of tautological entailшents and has some similarities witl1 
intuitionistic logic. 
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И.А. ВАСИЛЬЕВ И СУДЬБЫ КЛАССИЧЕСКОЙ 
ЛОГИКИ В ХХ ВЕКЕ 
Судьба классической логики в Новое время печальна. Её 
престиж методически разрушался сначала Ф . Бэконом и Де­
картом, затем Гегелем, а в ХХ веке - "постмодернистами". 
